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The assumption of serial operation of the three stages should he 
supported with evidence or disclaimed.
Massaro’s discussion of bottom-up versus to-down processing 
is oversimplified. The statement that lipreading provides bot- 
tom-up information seems fair within the task of identifying 
articulatory motor movements, but lipreading would seem to 
provide top-down or contextual information for the task of 
deciding what was heard. This line of reasoning suggests that a 
visual speech display should he adequate to take the place of 
lexical context within the phoneme restoration effect. That is, if 
a brief segment of the sound track of a videotape were replaced 
by noise, it should be perceptually restored by the uninter­
rupted visual display even if the missing segment were em bed­
ded in a nonsense string.
The debate about categorical perception seems correct but 
incomplete. It ignores the fact that there generally are peaks in 
the discrimination function at the category boundaries, and that 
the origin of these peaks is controversial. Theoretically, they 
could be evidence for an even weaker, but more viable, form of 
categorical perception. In addition, the developmental discus­
sion should interpret the finding that discrimination of sounds 
within a phonetic category in the infant’s native language de­
clines markedly across the first year of life (see Worker 1989 for a 
review).
The debate about modularity in speech perception also seems 
incomplete. The support for modularity (e.g., Liberman & 
Mattingly 1989) comes not only from trading relations among 
cues, which Massaro discussed in detail, but also from duplex 
perception (speech and nonspeech percepts arising concur­
rently from the same stimuli). It can probably be accounted for 
by learned perceptual modes rather than innate modules, but it 
needs to be interpreted within FLMP.
Finally, although this is not truly a criticism, the locus of 
integration relative to the conventional, generic descriptions of 
information processing remains unspecified. These are interest­
ing types of intermodal effects that should occur only if integra­
tion occurs sufficiently late in processing. For example, what if 
two complementan^ stimuli were presented within the McGurk 
paradigm (e.g., both visual /ga/ matched with auditory /ba /, and 
the converse), e ither by a male and a female speaking concur­
rently or by one person pronouncing two syllables in rapid 
succession? In which situations would the auditory and visual 
cues be recombined according to their phonetic identities? If 
recombinations occurred with successive presentation, would 
this suggest that perceptual syntheses of visual and auditory 
cues can be revised retroactively? Massaro’s book is most useful 
in provoking such research questions.
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Categorical perception of speech: A largely 
dead horse, surpassingly well kicked
Robert G. Crowder
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520 
Electronic mall: rgcrow@yalevm.bitnet
Twenty years ago I enjoyed startling friends and frightening 
undergraduates with the strong form of the claim that speech 
perception was categorical. Soon, studies by Barclay (1972) and 
Pisoni (1973) among several others, convinced me that people, 
after all, had access to continuous information, even for continua 
of stop-consonant syllables. Although quibbling has continued 
about what Massaro (1987, p. 118) calls the weak form of the 
hypothesis, I assumed that many informed bystanders, like me, 
really d idn’t need convincing of the general point. Thus, to find 
so much of the present book devoted to a relentless assault on 
categorical perception struck me as anticlimactic. But I leave to 
others the debate w hether this issue was already nearly closed.
If categorical perception, in its original sense, was too solidly 
discredited to have been taken seriously in the late 1980s, 
almost the opposite can be said of the Fuzzy Logical Model of 
Perception (FLMP), which is just as monotonously upheld by 
the research reported here. Not only is it victorious in the 
speech data, but in such diverse applications as person impres­
sions, category judgments, and sentence interpretation as well. 
The FLM P simply works too well, everywhere it has been 
applied. Ironically, the case for this model would actually be 
enhanced by the discovery of some domain in which it failed to 
beat all contenders in sight. This would be the exception that 
proved the rule, a concept I used to think silly, but now 
appreciate. The FLM P attracts too much attention in this book 
for my taste.
Which is a pity to the extent that the FLM P and the argument 
about categorical perception get in the way of other command­
ing virtues in Massaro’s approach. I count three of these, and 
they form the paradigm promised by the title of the book:
First, the book is data-intensive, without once losing sight of 
important ideas. Good ideas are, after all, cheap, and what 
distinguishes us as experimental psychologists from others in 
the cognitive sciences is that we demand public, empirical tests 
of our ideas, whereas others use different criteria for justifying 
their belief. Massaro’s book affirms the centrality of carefully 
arranged and abundant evidence to our science. In an area 
where some main ideas have derived from linguistics, this 
emphasis is all the more welcome.
Second, and more specifically about the testability of ideas, 
Massaro makes it clear that a hypothesis is not properly con­
firmed or falsified qualitatively, in a vacuum, but must rather be 
tested against a viable alternative hypothesis, both of them 
preferably worked out in enough detail to make quantitative 
predictions. I don’t claim, by the way, that my own hands are 
clean by this criterion, but I wonder if some of the false starts
y  *
and arguing-past-one-another that have occurred in my special­
ty would have been avoided if we had adopted the model- 
comparison principle years ago.
Finally, although Massaro’s book is closely focused on audio­
visual speech perception, it is also seriously attentive to a wide 
range of other applications in psychology, including the devel­
opment of perception, decision-making in general, and social 
impression-formation, as well as the other applications m en­
tioned above. Of course, this Catholicism should not be in­
terpre ted  as a purely transcendental virtue, since one of Mas­
saro’s strong contentions is that speech perception shares 
information-processing characteristics with other human ac­
tivities, outside of language. Thus he is advancing this case when 
he reports parallel findings in other areas. More research pro­
grams, perhaps similar to this one in method, will be necessary 
to decide w hether speech is “special’ because (a) the stimuli 
themselves are special, because (b) the brain locus is demonstra­
bly different from other kinds of processing, or because (c) the 
kind of information processing applied to speech signals is 
different from other modalities. Even scholars who might 
disagree vigorously on these three alternatives might never­
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Massaro’s enterprise is impressive, and there are many ways he 
could have brought it to a resounding conclusion. But the final 
paragraph he chose begins “If the present generalizations of the
760 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1989) 12:4
Commentary/Massaro: Speech perception
current research are reasonable, they strike a blow to the 
concept of modularity” (p. 281); his conclusion thus returns to 
the them e of his introduction (pp. 2-4), in which the concept of 
modularity was described, and its falsification in the following 
chapters prophesied. Massaro apparently sees modularity as the 
principal objective of his theoretical attack. Note that Massaro is 
not loath to tilt at sacred cows. Categorical perception is another 
prominent target of his lance. But modularity is the target he 
chose to set his sights upon in opening and in closing his book.
This is all very curious, because nothing in Massaro s work is 
crucially damaging to modularity; rather, his results offer the 
concept of modularity significant support. Consider the case for 
modularity as put by Fodor (1983; see also multiple book review 
in BBS 8(1) 1985). Fodor proposed nine properties of input 
systems by which their modularity was defined (Massaro lists 
these properties on pp. 2-3). In fact, these nine properties have 
not all been debated to the same extent. Most of the action in 
psycholinguistic argument has centred on principle five, the 
informational encapsulation of modular systems; this was pe r­
haps only to be expected from a field which has disputed 
autonomy versus interaction above all else for the better  part of 
two decades. To a lesser extent the principle of mandatoriness of 
operation has also proved contentious.
Now how does Massaros research address the issues with 
which psycholinguistics is obsessed? In one major way, at least, 
Massaro allies himself firmly with the autonomous camp. A 
crucial aspect of Massaro s Fuzzy Logical Model of Perception is 
the independence of separate sources of information in percep­
tion and recognition. Independence of information derived 
from separate sources is precisely what encapsulation requires; 
if the evaluation of one source of information is affected by what 
is coining in from another source of information, then the 
capsule has been penetra ted  and the principle is violated. Fodor 
argues that such dependen t  processing does not occur in m odu­
lar input systems. Massaro is equally adamant that it does not 
occur in any of the domains of his research. Insofar as Massaro 
has made this case, he has made about the most important case 
for modularity.
That Massaro is perfectly aware of this is clear from his brief 
allusions to connectionist models. Interactive-activation models 
allow activation from higher levels of processing to feed back to 
lower levels of processing, thereby altering the operation of the 
lower-level processes and hence obliterating their indepen­
dence. As Massaro points out, such models would make predic­
tions about the listening-plus-lipreading situation which are not 
borne out by his data. For instance, it would be reasonable to 
expect an unambiguous lipreading cue (such as closed lips for a 
bilabial) to affect the relative activation of auditory features for 
various phonemes, rendering the features of bilabial phonemes 
more active and of nonbilabial phonemes less active. Neither 
the facilitative nor the inhibitory prediction finds support in 
Massaro s results; he argues that this outcome “contradicts a 
fundamental assumption of TRACE (p. 171) and “provides 
important constraints on the assumptions that are viable for 
connectionist models” (p. 281). Thus he shows no reluctance to 
draw out the implications of his findings with respect to autono­
my versus interaction of processing levels.
The autonomy-interaction debate has become far more so­
phisticated in recent years. It is no longer assumed that the 
mere presence of context effects poses problems for an autono­
mous view; context effects can occur when multiple outputs of 
lower-level processing -  each even equiprobable given a d e ­
graded input -  are evaluated at a higher level (see e.g. Norris 
1986; Marslen-Wilson 1987). Again, this is a position of which 
Massaro approves: “the bottom-up information and the top- 
down information . . . function as independent sources . . . 
[which] illustrates once again that a positive effect of context 
does not necessarily imply that low-level processes . . . are 
dependen t  on higher-level processes” (p. 269). Clearly, he is an 
autonomist through and through.
Why, then, does Massaro consider himself to be arguing 
against modularity at all? The answer appears to be that he takes 
issue with another characteristic ascribed to modular systems, 
namely, domain-specificity. This is the principle that modular 
systems operate only upon their particular class of inputs, and 
are closely tuned to the specific properties of those inputs.
Domain-specificity is not one of the central pillars of the 
modularity temple. As Fodor points out, in one sense it is 
entirely trivial to say that the mechanisms which process 
language are domain-specific because language is what they 
process. But there are certain nontrivial aspects of domain- 
specificity. One is that processing by a modular system should 
be initiated only by input of its particular kind. Another is that 
the operations of the modular system should be sensitive to the 
particular characteristics of what is being processed.
What domain-specificity does not entail is that the operations 
of a modular system need be unlike the operations of other 
systems in every respect. Indeed, it would be astonishing if this 
were so. General constraints on processing by systems realised 
in neurological material will of course apply. Although a modu­
lar system will not draw upon resources shared with other 
systems, there is no reason why it should not carry out opera­
tions on its own type of input which are similar in kind to the 
operations carried out by other systems on their particular 
inputs. This is where Massaro appears to have misled himself: 
“by definition, a specialized process should not follow general 
principles” (p. 4). Massaro seems to have got hold of the wrong 
definition.
To clarify this distinction, imagine, a coin-sorting device 
which consigns coins of different denominations to different 
processing operations on the basis of weight. Since each opera­
tion is initiated by the weight characteristics specific to a partic­
ular denomination of coin, the restrictive initiation principle of 
domain-specificity is satisfied. We can also build in lots of 
denomination-specific characteristics of the processing that goes 
on -  pennies get painted black and shot out of a barrel, dimes get 
smashed to smithereens and mixed with sulphuric acid, quar­
ters get baked in a cake, and so on. And we can have all these 
specific processes go on in entirely separate and noncom­
municating compartments. But absolutely none of this alters the 
fact that the physical laws which govern the assessment of each 
coin s weight, and which further govern the way the coins 
tumble into the compartments, are the same for all coins; 
nor does the applicability of the laws of physics compromise 
the domain-specificity of the coin-processing. In fact, domain- 
specificity would not be compromised even if there were consid­
erable similarity between the operations -  if some part of each 
denomination s processing included a painting operation, for 
example.
Just the same sort of distinction is true in perceptual process­
ing. It is never going to be an argument against modularity to 
point to commonalities between different input systems either 
in general constraints or in operating characteristics. Yet that 
seems to by why Massaro thinks he is against modularity: 
“principles . . . of bimodal speech perception prove to be rele­
vant to a variety of behaviors (p. 4). But the principles in 
question are extremely general -  feature evaluation, integra­
tion, and pattern classification; “any model of recognition would 
have to assume stages functionally equivalent to these” (¡3. 152). 
Quite so. Thus Massaros chief case against modularity is null. In 
his final paragraph he makes, for the first time, a slightly 
different claim, namely, that processing of a general cognitive 
kind has been shown to engage supposedly encapsulated mod­
ules; but this only widens the definition of general cognitive 
processing, quite apart from the fact that the violation of encap­
sulation requires engaging general cognitive resources by an 
encapsulated module rather than vice versa. He follows this, 
however, by reiterating the principal point of his research: “the 
same fundamental processes contribute to an impressive variety 
of perceptual and cognitive actions” (p. 281). Since there is
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nothing in this general claim which is incompatible with m odu­
larity, it is a pleasure to welcome Massaro to the modular fold.
Models in the mind, modules on the lips
Beatrice de Gelder and Jean Vroomen
Departments of Psychology and Philosophy, Tilburg University, 5000 LE
Tilburg, The Netherlands
Electronic mail: beadegel(cyhtikub5.bitnet
As a consequence of studies of both sign language and lipreading 
it is now widely agreed that a comprehensive theory of speech 
perception (and production) must capture the common proper­
ties of the different modalities in which speech can be pe r­
ceived. Generally speaking, evidence from sign language and 
from lipreading has been welcomed by modularist speech theo­
rists. In contrast, Massaros contribution builds on more than a 
decade of his research on speech perception in the auditory and 
visual modality and arrives at a refutation of modularism. Modu- 
larists welcome lipreading evidence because they regard it as 
support for the view that speech perception draws upon a 
representational repertoire which is both language specific and 
amodal or abstract. Massaro believes that the bimodality of*
speech perception offers a spectacular insight into the general 
way the organism processes information, for example, by inte­
grating multiple sources of information. The existence of this 
general process is the core of his refutation of modularism.
We believe that the issue of information integration is 
orthogonal to the matter of modularity of speech perception. 
What matters is the domain specificity of the representations 
over which integration processes operate. Next, we consider the 
relevance of language-specific deficits in the visual and auditory 
modality observed in developmental dyslexia.
1. Modularity is about representations. Massaro claims that 
information integration is the basic principle of information 
processing in all domains of cognitive functioning. What aspects 
of the claims of modularism (as epitomized in Fodor 1983) does 
this refute? The core of modularism is the view that all cognitive 
processes are inferential but that some of them are subserved by 
a special purpose computational system having a restricted data­
base. So both modularism and Massaro agree that information 
processing is hypothesis testing and decision making. Going 
beyond this, modularism proposes a cognitive geography of 
decisions. Some decision processes are local because they are 
based on limited knowledge (e.g., they are domain specific and 
encapsulated). Massaro claims that a general model of decision 
making is enough -  that one does not need to go through the 
trouble of designing a (modular) model of the internal knowl­
edge environment of the organism to understand how decisions 
on inputs are reached. The crux of the disagreement is cate­
gorical versus continuous perception. In Massaro s view, cate­
gorical identification results from an integrative decision about a 
previous continuous evaluation process taking place separately 
in various dimensions. Modularism claims that evaluation itself 
is a decision process located in the language module and result­
ing in phonological representations. (This view leaves room for 
postmodular decisions about modular phonological representa­
tions).
How does evidence for modality specific coding square with 
e ither view? The answer is complicated by the fact that the 
notion of dimension and that of modality are orthogonal. Mas­
saro uses the multimodality of speech input as a privileged 
example to show that information processing consists of inte­
grating the input coming from various dimensions. This way he 
indicates that he treats modalities as dimensions and implies 
that phonological category decisions require integrating bi- 
modal information. Obviously, in normal circumstances both 
the visual and the auditory information are present. Still, when
auditory information is not deteriorated, it is perfectly possible 
to identify speech in the absence of information from the visual 
modality. But perception in the auditor)' modality still results 
from the integration of multiple features. Perception of sign 
language in congenitally deaf subjects offers a similar example of 
multiple dimensions of a stimulus within one modality. The real 
issue is categorical perception within one and the same 
modality.
2. Developmental dyslexia. Detailed studies of acquired dys­
lexia support the view that we are dealing with a specific 
impairment in the domain of written language skills (Shallice 
1988) which leaves intact decision processes in other domains of 
linguistic and nonlinguistic information processing. Such disor­
ders support modularism because as noted above, modularism 
is a thesis about the nature of representational resources re­
quired in decision processes. There  is a similar consensus about 
the language specificity of the deficits observed in developm en­
tal reading disorders. W e have explored the idea that reading 
acquisition disorders might be related to spoken language defi­
cits. By looking also at speech perception in the visual modality 
one might get a fuller picture of the speech processing abilities 
of young dyslexics. Alternatively, this approach could reveal the 
existence of bimodal integration difficulties.
One could use a stimulus tape made by Massaro (Massaro & 
Cohen 1983a) to examine this issue. O ur results (de Gelder & 
Vroomen 1988) show that young dyslexics have less robust 
auditor)' speech categories when their performance is compared 
with that of control groups (both reading age and chronological 
age). This confirms the findings of W erker and Tees (1986). Our 
subjects also lag in processing speech information in the visual 
modality. These modality-based deficits show a significant cor­
relation which could suggest a deficit in representational re ­
sources shared by visual and auditory information processing. 
Does the McGurk illusion also suggest a common resource 
explanation? does it show late categorization within each 
modality? or does it illustrate late integration of both modalities, 
as Massaro believes it does?
W hen presented  with auditory /ba/  and a visual /ga/, sub­
je c t ’s report hearing a phonem e that is a fusion of both, a /da/. 
On presentation of an auditor)' /da/ and a visual /ba/, the subject 
reports a blend, /bda/.  Massaro s model (which does not give 
the full details of the representations activated at the various 
stages in processing) explains the former case but might have 
difficulty with the latter. He treats the perception of /bda/ as the 
identification of a single integrated speech event which is no 
exception to the general integration formula. The /b / in /bda/ is 
indeed an integrated percept because subjects never report 
/m da/  or /pda/.  There  is, however, no visual influence in the 
/da/ part of /bda/.  In other words, there is conflict plus integra­
tion.
The extent to which there can be conflict between modalities 
would appear to be closely related to the robustness of the 
representations in each modality. Indirect evidence about 
robustness of modality-specific coding has been obtained by 
using a serial recall paradigm (Massaro 1987, p. 50). Adapting 
the paradigm of the auditory recency effect in serial recall, 
Campbell and Dodd (1980) found that lip-read lists show recen­
cy just as auditory presented lists do. This suggests that there is a 
common language source for both modalities.
In a recent study using a large population of subjects we find 
that a visual suffix has no influence on the recency effect of 
stimuli presented  auditorily. More surprisingly, an auditory 
suffix with no visual articulation does not affect recency in a 
visually presented  list (de Gelder & Vroomen 1989). This 
suggests that besides shared resources for both modalities (mod­
ularism) or late integration of visual and auditory information 
(Massaro), there is still room for modality specific codes. One 
would need to know more about the influence of linguistic 
experience on speech perception to have strong views in these 
matters (Bertelson & de Gelder 1989).
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